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PROSECUIOR V. CHARLEs GHANKAY TAYLOR, APPEALS
JUDGMENT (No. SCSL-03-01-A)
On September 26, 2013, the Appeals Chamber of the Special
Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) upheld Trial Chamber II's con-
viction of former Liberian President Charles Ghankay Taylor
and affirmed his sentence of fifty years imprisonment. Taylor,
who ruled Liberia from 1997 to 2003, was convicted May 30,
2012 on all eleven counts of the indictment. This included five
counts of crimes against humanity punishable under Article 2 of
the SCSL Statute (murder, rape, sexual slavery, other inhumane
acts, and enslavement); five counts under Common Article 3
and Additional Protocol II punishable under Article 3 of the
Statute (acts of terrorism; violence to life, health and physical
or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder and cruel
treatment; outrages upon personal dignity; and pillage); and one
count of serious violations of international humanitarian law
punishable under Article 4 of Statute (conscripting and enlisting
child soldiers under fifteen years old). Specifically, Taylor was
convicted of aiding and abetting and planning crimes carried
out by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and Armed Forces
Revolutionary Council (AFRC) in the districts of Bombali,
Kailahun, Kenema, Kono, Port Loko, and Freetown, and the
Western Area. Both the Prosecution and Taylor appealed the
Trial Chamber's decision, with the Prosecution raising four
grounds and Taylor forty-five.
JUDGMENT REGARDING PROSECUTION'S APPEALS
Among the Prosecution's grounds for appeal was a claim
that Trial Chamber II erred by failing to find that, in addition
to aiding and abetting and planning the charged crimes, he
was responsible for ordering and instigating those crimes. The
Appeals Chamber declined to entertain the substance of this
challenge, however, finding that even if it were to grant the
grounds for appeal, "this would have no impact on the existing
convictions and Taylor would not be convicted of more crimes
than he already has been." According to the Appeals Chamber,
the convictions of Taylor based on aiding and abetting and
planning liability "fully capture[d]" Taylor's "culpable acts and
conduct," and thus the Prosecution had failed to demonstrate
an error occasioning a miscarriage of justice with regard to this
challenge.
The Prosecution also challenged the Trial Chamber's deci-
sion to exclude evidence relating to crimes allegedly commit-
ted in locations not specifically mentioned in the indictment.
Specifically, the Prosecution maintained that the use of certain
phrases in the indictment, such as "various locations" in a dis-
trict and "throughout a district," was sufficient to put the accused
on notice that he was being charged with crimes in locations
not expressly named. In response, the Appeals Chamber began
by acknowledging that, in Sesay, et al., it had held that "[i]n
some cases, the widespread nature and sheer scale of crimes
make it unnecessary and impracticable to require a high degree
of specificity" in the indictment. Nevertheless, the Chamber
also reiterated that it is for the Trial Chamber to decide, on a
case-by-case basis, whether such "inclusive pleading of loca-
tions" in fact provided the accused with sufficient notice to
prepare a defense, taking into account "the fair trial rights of the
accused, the Prosecution's obligation to plead clearly the mate-
rial facts it intends to prove, the particulars of the case and the
interests of justice." Here, the Appeals Chamber was satisfied
that the Trial Chamber undertook the necessary analysis and
thus did not overturn its decision to exclude evidence relating to
crimes not specifically pleaded in the indictment. The Appeals
Chamber also upheld the Trial Chamber's decision holding that
the Prosecution had failed to adequately "cure" the defective
indictment, despite the Prosecution's claims that it had provided
clear, consistent, and timely information that would have placed
the Defense on notice of the additional charges. According to
the Appeals Chamber, a Trial Chamber is not required to find
that a defective indictment has been cured, but rather it must act
in the interests of justice and consistently with the rights of the
accused. Here, the Trial Chamber acted within its discretion in
declining to find that the indictment had been adequately cured.
Finally, the Prosecution appealed the sentence, arguing
that the fifty-year prison sentence handed down by the Trial
Chamber was woefully inadequate given the nature and severity
of Taylor's crimes. The Appeals Chamber disagreed, noting that
the Trial Chamber carefully reviewed the nature and gravity of
the crimes, as well as any aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances, and concluded that the Trial Chamber's sentence was
"fair and reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances."
JUDGMENT REGARDING TAYLOR'S APPEALS
The Chamber categorized Taylor's grounds for appeal into
seven categories, namely: systematic errors in the evaluation of
evidence; errors that invalidate the planning convictions; errors
that invalidate the aiding and abetting convictions; irregulari-
ties in the judicial process; errors undermining the fairness of
the proceeding; "miscellaneous" errors; and errors relating
to the sentence. This summary will only address the Appeals
Chamber's response to a handful of these challenges.
First, regarding the challenges to the Trial Chamber's evalu-
ation of the evidence, Taylor contended, inter alia, that the
Prosecution inappropriately relied on uncorroborated, hearsay
evidence from biased witnesses who received benefits for testi-
fying against him. The Appeals Chamber began its analysis of
the Defense's various claims relating to evidence by stressing
that Rule 89 of the SCSL's Rules of Procedure and Evidence
broadly provides that "[a] Chamber may admit any relevant
evidence," and that this provision "is in consonance with the
recognition that flexibility in admitting and evaluating evidence
in trials for violations of international criminal law is justified
by the sui generis nature of these trials." It also stressed that the
rules governing the SCSL do not require corroboration of any
single witness's testimony or other piece of evidence, nor do
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they exclude hearsay evidence or prevent a Trial Chamber from
relying on the testimony of "insider" witnesses. Rather, corrobo-
ration, the hearsay nature of evidence, and the circumstances of
the witness are all factors to be considered by the Trial Chamber
in assessing the credibility of evidence and the reliability and
weight to be given that evidence. Finally, the Appeals Chamber
recalled that it will uphold a Trial Chamber's findings relating to
the credibility of evidence unless it finds that no reasonable trier
of fact could have reached the same conclusion. Applying these
general principles, the Appeals Chamber dismissed each of the
Defense's evidentiary challenges.
Next, the Appeals Chamber turned to Taylor's claim that the
Trial Chamber erred in its assessment of aiding and abetting
liability. The Trial Chamber had found that Taylor satisfied the
requirements for such liability because he lent assistance to the
RUF and AFRC, that this assistance had a substantial effect on
the commission of the crimes, and that he acted with knowledge
that his assistance would have a substantial impact on the com-
mission of crimes and with knowledge of the physical perpetra-
tors' intention to carry out the crimes. According to the Defense,
this approach violated the "principle of personal culpability" by:
"(i) criminalising any contribution made to a party to an armed
conflict; (ii) failing to distinguish between neutral and intrinsi-
cally criminal assistance; and (iii) improperly characterising the
RUF/AFRC as a criminal organization." Further, the Defense
challenged the Trial Chamber's application of a "knowledge"
standard rather than a "purpose" standard in evaluating the
requisite mens rea for aiding and abetting. Before turning to
the specifics of these challenges, the Appeals Chamber recalled
that the SCSL Statute does not "expressly establish" the actus
reus and mens rea elements of the modes of liability. However,
it noted, Rule 72bis of the Court's Rules of Procedure and
Evidence makes clear that the "principles and rules of interna-
tional customary law" are applicable sources of law to which the
Appeals Chamber may resort in giving effect to the object and
purpose of the Statute.
Against this background, the Appeals Chamber first consid-
ered the actus reus element of aiding and abetting liability. As
an initial matter, the Appeals Chamber rejected the Defense's
position that the Trial Chamber was required to find that Taylor
provided assistance to the specific individual who physically
perpetrated each specific act underlying a crime. Rather, the
Appeals Chamber held that the actus reus of aiding and abetting
"is established by assistance that has a substantial effect on the
crime, not by the particular manner in which such assistance
is provided." In addition to this analysis, the Appeals Chamber
considered whether "specific direction" is an element of the
actus reus of aiding and abetting liability. While the Defense
did not raise this argument on appeal, the Appeals Chamber
addressed it in light of the recent judgment issued by the
Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in Perifi . In that judgment, the
ICTY acquitted Serbian and former Yugoslavian Chief of Staff
General Mom ilo Perisi of aiding and abetting war crimes based
on a finding that the assistance Perisi provided to the Bosnian
Serb army - an organization that was engaged in both lawful and
unlawful activity during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia
- was not "specifically directed" towards the army's criminal
activities. However, the SCSL Appeals Chamber rejected this
approach after conducting an independent review of the custom-
ary international law status of aiding and abetting liability and
finding no support for the Perisid judgment's requirement of
"specific direction."1 Lastly, the Appeals Chamber dismissed
the Defense's challenge relating to the mens rea of aiding and
abetting liability, refusing to adopt the notion that the Trial
Chamber should have been required to find that Taylor actively
willed or desired the commission of the crimes because such
requirement would be inconsistent with the customary interna-
tional law definition of aiding and abetting liability.
Next, the Appeals Chamber considered the Defense's chal-
lenge to the Trial Chamber's findings regarding planning liabil-
ity, which was based on a claim that the Trial Chamber erred by
failing to require that the Prosecution prove he planned particu-
lar, "concrete crimes" Specifically, the Defense cited to Brdanin,
a case tried before the ICTY, in which the Trial Chamber held:
"Where there is evidence of an accused having formulated a plan
that does not constitute a plan to commit concrete crimes, this
does not give rise to a liability through the mode of liability of
'planning."' However, the SCSL Appeals Chamber declined to
follow the Brdanin Trial Chamber, noting not only that subse-
quent ICTY jurisprudence had rejected this approach, but also
that the Special Court's own Trial Chamber held in Brima, et al.
that the Brdanin interpretation was "an overly narrow construc-
tion of the responsibility for planning." Instead, the Appeals
Chamber held that the requirement that the accused participated
"in designing an act or omission and thereby had a substantial
effect on the commission of the crime" was "sufficient to estab-
lish the culpable link between the accused and the crimes." Note,
however, that the Appeals Chamber did overturn certain counts
of the Trial Chamber's planning conviction based on a finding
that the Trial Chamber failed to provide a reasoned opinion in its
judgment in relation to Taylor's guilt for planning certain crimes
occurring in the Kono District. This holding had no effect on
Taylor's sentence.
Taylor is currently serving his sentence in a maximum-secu-
rity prison in Great Britain, as his requests to be transferred to
Rwanda were denied. He is the only head of state to be convicted
of war crimes or crimes against humanity by an international
tribunal since the Nuremburg trials.
Written by Patty Walsh, a first-year law student at American
University Washington College of Law, and edited by Katherine
Cleary Thompson, Assistant Director ofthe War Crimes Research
Office.
1 It should be noted that the ICTY Appeals Chamber has recently
adopted the same position as the SCSL Appeals Chamber in another
case, calling into question the validity of the holding in Perific even
as it pertains to the ICTY. See Prosecutor v. Sainovic et al, Case No.
IT-05-87-A, ICTY Appeals Judgment (23 January 2014).
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